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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20040685-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss the charge of driving under the influence, a third degree felony upon 
enhancement with priors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2003) (R. 1-2) 
(statute is attached in Add. A). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Without notice to or input from the parties, did the trial court erroneously 
determine that the State should have but failed to establish compliance with Rule 9-
301(2)(B), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, in the taking of defendant's two prior 
DUI guilty pleas? 
A ruling on a motion to dismiss is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416,17, 82 P.3d 219; State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981 
(Utah App. 1995). 
Preservation: The challenge involves the presumption of regularity, which was 
discussed numerous times below (R. 43-46, 61-63, 132-33, 147-51; R. 186: 3-9, 31-34, 
79-80). The prosecutor sought reconsideration of the trial court's opinion following its 
issuance (R. 153-54). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 9-301, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, is relevant to the issue on 
appeal (in Add, A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol [DUI], 
enhanced to a third degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2003), 
based on two or more prior convictions under the same statute within ten years of the 
instant violation (R. 1-2). One of defendant's friends interpreted for him at his initial 
appearance, after which defendant hired his own counsel (R. 5-7). At the preliminary 
hearing October 16, 2002, the State proffered the arresting officer's testimony that 
defendant had a blood alcohol content of .176 (R. 42-43). The State also submitted 
certified records of defendant's prior DUI convictions based on guilty pleas in two 
2 
different Justice Courts: one in Grand County in 1997 and one in Emery County in 2001 
(R. 25,42-43,60,114). 
Defendant moved to dismiss the enhanced charge, filing two supporting 
memoranda which argued that reliance on the prior Justice Court convictions would 
violate his constitutional due process rights because: 1) Justice Courts are not courts of 
record; 2) Justice Court judges are not "law trained"; and 3) defendant was not informed 
of the potential enhancement effect his guilty pleas could have (R. 11-38, 48-58). 
Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the matter was temporarily suspended 
pending a decision in two appellate cases involving a similar issue (R. 11-34, 42-58, 60-
64, 70-73).1 
Thereafter, defendant filed another motion to dismiss, arguing his previous points 
and adding two more: 1) the language of the DUI statute does not permit the use of prior 
convictions to enhance violations occurring after July 1, 2001; and 2) the Justice Courts' 
jurisdiction extends to "petty offenses" only, which does not include driving under the 
influence of alcohol (R. 87-90). Following briefing, the trial court issued a ruling 
granting defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 83-84, 87-94, 102-44) (ruling attached in Add. 
B). The court rejected all of defendant's arguments and ruled instead on an issue raised 
1
 Those cases, State v. Soto, 2003 UT App 382 (unpublished), and State v. 
Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775, were argued June 19, 2003. Although the 
record does not contain an order by the trial court suspending the proceedings, nothing 
appears in the record between June 11, 2003, and February 5, 2004, when the parties in 
this case were notified of the arraignment scheduled for February 18 (R. 76-78). 
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sua sponte by the trial judge without input from either party (R. 148-51). Add. B. The 
trial judge found that "the State did not meet its burden of proving compliance with Rule 
9-301, [Utah Code of Judicial Administration] and therefore the prior judgements may not 
be used to enhance the punishments and/or degree of offense provided for by multiple 
convictions under Utah Law" (R. 148). Add. B. The prosecutor sought reconsideration 
of the decision, in response to which the trial judge affirmed the dismissal without further 
briefing or argument from the parties (R. 153-71) (motion and ruling attached in Add. C). 
The State timely appealed (R. 172-73). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 2, 2002, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol (R. 1-2, 42-43). His blood alcohol content was found to be .176 (R. 42). 
According to defense counsel, defendant was stopped for improper lane travel in Green 
River, Utah (R. 114). The officer obtained defendant's driver's license and could smell 
alcohol on defendant's breath (id). Defendant failed subsequent field sobriety tests (id). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused it's discretion in dismissing the enhanced charged based on 
the State's failure to establish that the written statements used in both Justice Courts 
complied with Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 9-301(2)(B). The dismissal 
occurred despite the fact that the parties had no notice of the issue and no meaningful 
opportunity to address it prior to issuance of the trial judge's decision. The matter was 
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raised sua sponte by the trial judge after the case had been submitted for decision and was 
the sole basis for the dismissal of the charge. 
The trial judge erred in raising and addressing the issue without notice to or 
opportunity for input from the parties because it improperly subverted the unrebutted 
presumption to which the State was entitled by law. The prosecutor's production of 
certified copies of the prior judgments gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of regularity 
in those prior pleas. The trial judge ruled that defendant failed to shift that burden, and he 
rejected the claims defendant had raised. Accordingly, the burden of establishing the 
voluntariness of the prior pleas never shifted back to the State, and dismissal was not 
warranted. Moreover, the evidence adduced in the course of the hearing on defendant's 
claims establishes that both Justice Courts used written statements and that those 
statements were available had the parties had notice of the compliance issue on which the 
case would be decided. 
Additionally, because defendant had not raised the issue, the ruling placed the trial 
judge in the role of advocate—a role he repeated when he ruled on the prosecutor's 
motion for reconsideration without seeking any input from defendant. Such action is to 
be viewed with disapproval as contrary to the interests of justice. 
Further, the judge's invalidation of the prior pleas for enhancement purposes is 
exactly what this Court determined should not happen in State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 
381,81 P.3d 775. Defendant did not establish, and the trial judge did not find, that the 
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prior pleas were, in fact, unknowing or involuntary, which is required in the course of a 
collateral attack on the prior pleas. Hence, under Marshall, there was not a sufficient 
basis upon which to invalidate the pleas for enhancement purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ENHANCED 
CHARGED BASED ON A SUA SPONTE ISSUE WITHOUT NOTICE 
TO THE PARTIES OR AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, 
THEREBY IMPROPERLY DISPENSING WITH THE 
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AS WELL AS 
INAPPROPRIATELY ADVOCATING ON DEFENDANT'S 
BEHALF 
The trial court dismissed the enhanced charge against defendant because the State 
failed to prove that when defendant entered his previous guilty pleas in two Justice 
Courts, he signed in each court "a statement acknowledging that [he ] . . . understood] his 
rights and that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive[d] those rights" (R. 149). 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 9-301. The court, abused its discretion in 
dismissing the charge because the prosecutor was entitled to the benefit of the unrebutted 
presumption of regularity which had attached when certified copies of the prior 
judgments were presented at the preliminary hearing. Further, the trial judge became an 
advocate for defendant by means of his ruling, advancing an issue defendant could have 
but failed to raise and using it to rule in defendant's favor without prior input from the 
prosecution. 
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A. The Rule and the Ruling 
The charged enhancement was based on two prior guilty pleas entered in two 
different Justice Courts. Rule 9-301, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (UDJA), 
provides: 
(1) At the time of arraignment, the justice court judge shall 
determine whether the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty if 
convicted of the same offense in the future. 
(2) If the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty, upon 
the entry of a plea of guilty, the justice court judge shall: 
(A) Advise the defendant, orally and in writing[,] of 
the defendant's rights, the elements of the charged offense, 
the penalties for the charged offense, and the enhancement 
penalty which maybe imposed in the event the defendant is 
convicted of the same offense in the future; and 
(B) Require the defendant to sign a statement 
acknowledging that the defendant understands his rights and 
that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives those 
rights. 
(3) Upon the entry of a guilty plea or receipt of a conviction, the 
justice court judge shall execute a written and signed judgment of 
conviction and forward the appropriate information and/or fingerprints to 
the state agencies responsible for maintaining criminal records. 
Add. A. 
After considering defendant's two motions to dismiss, his three supporting 
memoranda, the State's opposing memoranda, and the evidence adduced at the 
evidentiary hearing and the parties' arguments thereafter, the trial court entered a written 
ruling dismissing the enhanced charged without prejudice and permitting the prosecution 
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to "file a lesser offense if it feels [the] same is justified" (R. 149). Add. B. The judge 
rejected all defendant's arguments and granted his motion on a sua sponte ground without 
notice to or meaningful opportunity for input from the parties: 
The Court believes that I must address Sua Sponte the question of 
compliance by the Justice Court Judges with Rule 9-301, URJA [sic]. 
Neither Judge had evidence of a written advisory of rights and enhancement 
possibilities required under Rule 9-301(2)(A), Judge Cox's policy was to 
give written notice to defendant, but to destroy evidence thereof upon 
completion of each case, only retaining the Citation, Information and 
Judgment. His testimony did not confirm what he specifically did in this 
case nor should we expect such specific memory after such a long time. 
Judge Burnes said no copy of a Written Notice was in the file so she 
thought one had not been given defendant although she had forms (as did 
Judge Cox) that made such explanations. Counsel reviewed these forms 
and I believe defense counsel referred to language therein in her 
examination of her client. However, neither counsel offered the forms as 
exhibits herein. 
I agree with Judge Bryner's decision in State of Utah vs. Jose Luis 
Telles, 021700133, especially, that the Judicial Council meant for the 
failure of compliance with the Rule to have some consequence. I therefore 
urge Justice Courts to issue and retain copies of such document(s). 
However, they are only evidence of compliance.. . . [S]ince the forms were 
not offered, and I don't know whether the forms have provision for 
defendant's signature, I cannot conclude anything about the adequacy of the 
form to comply with Rule 9-301(2)(B) URJA [sic]." 
(R. 148-49) (emphasis in original).2 Add. B. The judge then ruled that "the State did not 
meet its burden of proving compliance with Rule 9-301 URJA [sic] and therefore the 
2No additional reference to or explanation of State v. Telles appears in the record, 
demonstrating the trial judge's efforts to research the issue. 
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prior judgements may not be used to enhance the punishments and/or degree of offense 
provided for by multiple convictions under Utah Law" (R. 149). Add. B. 
The prosecutor sought reconsideration, arguing that, contrary to the trial judge's 
ruling, this Court's decision in State v. Marshall 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775, cert 
denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004), dictated that a violation of Rule 9-301 would not 
prevent use of the Justice Court convictions for enhancement purposes (R. 153-54). Add. 
C. Without a response from defendant or argument by the parties, the trial judge issued 
an order confirming its prior decision (R. 169-71). Add. C. The judge distinguished 
Marshall, concluding 
that the 'direct vs. collateral' dichotomy [used in Marshall] is useful with 
respect to courts of record, but I believe that the judicial council in 
promulgating the rule had in mind the distinction between Justice Courts 
and Courts of Record, and expected compliance with that rule, and I believe 
they anticipated consequences of non-compliance. The Court has 
concluded in this case that the state failed to prove compliance and 
therefore I am left with determining what consequences non-compliance 
should have. My determination is that non-compliance with the rule should 
have the effect of preventing the state from using any conviction before a 
Justice of the Peace /Court where the evidence does not show by a 
preponderance that the rule was in fact complied with. I note that the rule 
provides for oral and written specifics and further a signature of the 
defendant. In the case before this Court, to wit the Gonzales case, the state 
failed to prove that compliance and therefore the Court ordered the 
dismissal and after review confirms that decision as of this date. 
(R. 169). Add. C. 
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B. The Trial Court Erred by Basing His Decision on an Issue Neither Raised nor 
Argued by the Parties with no Meaningful Opportunity by the State to 
Defend or Adduce the Evidence at Issue 
The trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing the enhanced charged because, 
in doing so, he eradicated the presumption of regularity which arose under the law, and he 
became an advocate for defendant, excusing defendant's failure to raise an issue, 
conducting independent research, and ruling in defendant's favor with no input from him 
and no meaningful opportunity for input from the prosecutor,, 
The ruling constitutes error because it is contrary to the presumption of regularity 
that arose by law and remained unrebutted in this case. See State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 
146, 149 (Utah 1989). Defendant below attempted to invalidate the prior Justice Court 
pleas to prevent their use to enhance his charge to a felony. To do so, he claimed a 
violation of his right to counsel in both his prior cases and argued generally that pleas 
entered in Justice Courts were unavailable for enhancement purposes in any event (R. 11-
38, 48-58, 87-90). His was a collateral attack on the prior pleas, which pleas must be 
upheld if they were entered voluntarily. See State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^ 7, 68 
P.3d 1035 (addressing a collateral attack on prior guilty pleas entered in district court 
under rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
This Court has repeatedly recognized the procedure for reviewing such challenges 
to the use of prior convictions for enhancement purposes under the DUI statute. 
[Ojnce the State has proven a prior conviction, a presumption of regularity 
arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce 'some evidence' of 
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involuntariness. [State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146,149 (Utah 1989).] Upon a 
showing of some evidence of involuntariness, the burden shifts back to the 
State to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. 
Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, f 7; see also State v. Pooler, 2002 UT App 299, f 7, 56 P.3d 
979 (affirming trial court's denial of a motion to strike prior convictions where the State 
properly introduced evidence of defendant's prior DUI convictions, and defendant 
produced no evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity). The trial judge was fully 
aware of this procedure throughout the proceedings below. He acknowledged that the 
prosecutor met his initial burden by producing at both the preliminary hearing and the 
evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion a certified copy of each of the two prior 
judgments (R. 186: 3-5, 33). The judge noted the evidence and expressly shifted to 
defendant the burden of proving his claims (R. 186: 4-6, 31-33). Defendant called and 
examined one of the Justice Court judges, after which the trial judge reminded defendant 
that he carried the burden of proof at that point and that his examination of his first 
witness did nothing to shift the burden back to the State (R. 186: 31-34). 
In his written ruling, the trial judge rejected the claims raised by defendant, 
holding that defendant did not carry his burden of establishing "some evidence" to rebut 
the presumption of regularity (R. 148). See Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149. The judge 
explained that "[b]oth the presumption of regularity and the evidence preponderates to the 
contrary [of what defendant claimed] and I would normally deny the Motion to Dismiss .. 
.." (R. 151). This ruling comports with the established case law. See Triptow, 770 P.2d 
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at 149; Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95,1f 7; Pooler, 2002 UT App 299,17. Under that law, 
the burden of proof never shifted back to the State to establish the voluntariness of the 
convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149 (once the 
State introduced documents establishing the requisite prior convictions, defendant was 
required both to raise his challenge to the presumption and to adduce evidence to support 
it; his failure to do so left the presumption of regularity in place and resulted in 
affirmance of his conviction on appeal); see also Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, \ 21; 
Pooler, 2002 UT App 299, \ 7 ("Because Defendant failed to provide 'some evidence' to 
rebut the initial presumption, the trial court could presume the regularity of the 
proceedings.") (quoting Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149). 
Instead of simply disposing of defendant's claims, the trial judge went on to 
address sua sponte compliance by the Justice Court judges with Rule 9-301 (R. 148). 
Add. B. He found that "the State did not meet its burden of proving compliance with" the 
rule, with the result that "the prior judgments may not be used to enhance the punishments 
and/or degree of offense provided for by multiple convictions under Utah Law" (R. 149). 
Add. B. Specifically, he found that defendant had been advised of the necessary 
information pursuant to subsection (2)(A), but that the prosecutor failed to offer into 
evidence the written forms used by the Justice Court judges, thereby preventing the trial 
court from determining whether the forms complied with the requirements of subsection 
12 
(2)(B) (R. 149).3 Add. B. Absent proof of compliance, the court ruled, the prior 
convictions were unavailable for enhancement use (id). 
The ruling eviscerated the presumption of regularity with no notice to the State that 
the presumption was gone and no opportunity for the prosecutor to meet the resulting 
burden of proving the requisite compliance with the rule. The trial judge recognized 
numerous times that the presumption had arisen (R. 148; R. 186: 3-5, 32-34), that it had 
not been rebutted (R. 148), and even that defendant had not raised a challenge involving 
written compliance with subsection (2)(B) (R. 148). Yet, he went on to entirely dispense 
with the presumption by raising, researching, and ruling on a new issue. 
Such action has been viewed with disapproval in this jurisdiction, where it is 
inappropriate for a trial court to raise an issue on behalf of a party and, thereby, act as an 
advocate. See, e.g., Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680P.2d733, 736 
(Utah 1984) ("[A] trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented 
for determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues [presented] are a nullity."); 
3During the evidentiary hearing, it was established that both justices use a written 
form in their courtroom to inform defendants of their rights and the potential for 
enhancement (R. 186: 15-16, 21-23, 25-26, 35-36, 39-42, 48-50). The trial judge noted 
that the parties used one of the forms in their examination of witnesses at the hearing (R. 
149). Add. B. Because the evidence was aimed specifically at defendant's claims 
regarding his right to counsel in the justice courts, neither party felt compelled to submit 
the forms into evidence. However, it is clear on this record that the forms were available 
and could have been produced had the parties known of the trial judge's concern with 
subsection (2)(B). The testimony also suggests that the forms included all the necessary 
rights and warned of the enhancement possibilities in compliance with the requirements 
of subsection (2)(B) (R. 15-16, 18, 21-23, 25-26, 35, 39-40, 42-44, 48-50). 
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Girardv. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983) ("Preservation of the integrity of the 
adversarial system of conducting trials precludes the court from infringing upon counsel's 
role of advocacy . . . . [T]he interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds 
its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would otherwise be dead . . . 
."); Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Utah App. 1994) (Bench, J., dissenting), cert 
denied513 U.S. 1191 (1995); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com% 847 P.2d 
418, 420-21 (Utah App 1993) (applying the same to administrative tribunals). Cf Birch 
Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993) (the trial court erred in 
granting a permanent injunction on a motion for a preliminary injunction, regardless of 
whether a permanent injunction would have been appropriate upon proper motion). 
Further, the law requires that a defendant raise his claims and objections in the trial court 
or waive them. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (setting forth and 
explaining the "preservation rule"). Finally, defense counsel may choose the issues he 
will raise as determined by his trial strategy. See State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, f^ 
58, 57 P.3d 1139 (noting counsel's right to make legitimate strategic choices, no matter 
how flawed they appear in retrospect). Defendant could have raised this issue, but he did 
not. The court's conduct in not only raising and researching it, but resting its decision on 
it, interferes with both the preservation rule and defendant's ability to manage his own 
case, thereby amounting to impermissible advocacy by the court. 
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That is not to say that the trial court cannot identify issues or concerns it believes 
are relevant or crucial. However, the parties must be provided the opportunity to address 
the matter, removing the trial judge from any appearance of advocacy. Cf. Preuss v. 
Wilkerson, 858 P.2d 1362, 1362-63 (Utah 1993) (trial court must provide notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before dismissing a claim for failure to prosecute); Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) ("Timely and adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural 
fairness."); Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah App. 1997) (where the trial court 
issued a decision stating it was considering sanctions against a party and stating that a 
hearing would be held to permit input, then imposed sanctions without the hearing or 
otherwise calling for a response, the appellate court reversed the sanctions and remanded 
to permit appellant an opportunity to be heard); Jenkins, 868 P.2d at 1383 ("The right to 
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard is a critical part of our judicial system . . . . A 
method of resolving cases that bypasses this requirement can not be accepted as a fair, 
neutral, and rational process.'") (Bench, J., dissenting) (quoting Rubins v. Plummer, 813 
P.2d 778, 780 (Colo.App. 1990). 
In our judicial system, except in extraordinary circumstances . . . , all 
parties are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a 
court and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue 
before decision. The failure to give adequate notice and opportunity to 
participate can constitute a denial of due process under article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Plumb v. State , 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990). 
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That did not occur in any meaningful way in this case. Although the trial judge 
initially indicated a concern regarding rule 9-301, he did not identify the problem, and, 
over time, the parties ultimately believed that the matter was no longer an issue. 
Two months after the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge notified the parties that he 
wanted oral argument "on the effect of Rule 9-301 URJA on the issues involved in 
previous oral arguments . . . . " (R. 67). No specifics were included, no written input was 
requested, and subsection (2)(B) was not identified. The argument was continued one 
month upon stipulation of counsel (R. 69). However, defendant thereafter moved to 
vacate argument because the issue was included in two court of appeals cases scheduled 
to be argued within the following five weeks: State v. Soto, 2003 UT App 382 
(unpublished) and State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,81 P.3d 775 (R. 70) (both 
attached in Add. D).4 The trial judge granted the motion, and defendant immediately 
moved to submit the matter for decision, apparently positioning himself to avoid any 
adverse appellate ruling on the matter (R. 72-74). The State objected, and nothing fiirther 
occurred in this case pending a resolution of the appellate cases (R. 75). Those cases 
were resolved in the State's favor five months later. See Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,81 
P.3d 775; Soto, 2003 UT App 382 (unpublished).5 
4Both cases were defense appeals involving interpretation of the statutory DUI 
enhancement provision. Both included an ex post facto challenge, and Marshall included 
a due process argument. 
5Marshall involved a defendant charged in district court with a felony DUI 
enhanced due to two prior DUI convictions entered in Justice Courts. 2003 UT App at fflf 
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Nearly three months after the appellate opinions issued, this case again became 
active, and defendant filed another motion to dismiss (R. 77-84). None of the supporting 
or opposing memoranda addressed rule 9-301 in any way (R. 83-84, 87-88, 91-94,102-
44). The State informed the trial court that defendant's claims had been decided against 
him in Marshall and Soto (R. 91-92, 125). The matter was submitted on the written 
documents with no objection from defendant and no request for oral argument (R. 145-
46). One month later, the court issued its written ruling, raising subsection (2)(B) 
1,3. In ruling that Marshall had established neither his entitlement to nor the absence of 
specific notice of future enhancement possibilities, the Court looked at Rule 9-301 and 
observed that when a court is faced with enhancement of a DUI charge based on prior 
DUI convictions arising from guilty pleas, "it does not follow that those pleas would be 
invalidated for enhancement purposes based solely on a failure to comply with Rule 9-
301 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration." Id. at j^ 21, n.9. This Court reasoned 
that invalidation of a prior conviction for enhancement purposes does not follow if the 
problem with the conviction amounts to a violation of a prophylactic provision of a 
procedural rule, explaining, 
[F]ailure to comply with [procedural rules, including] rule 11 [of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure] in taking a guilty plea does not in itself 
amount to a violation of a defendant's rights under either the Utah or the 
United States Constitution. To [collaterally attack a conviction], a 
petitioner must show more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of 
[a procedural rule]; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact not 
knowing and voluntary. 
Id (quoting Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)). Absent proof that the 
plea was not knowing and voluntary, the prior conviction remains valid for enhancement 
purposes. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (requiring only "two prior convictions" as a 
prerequisite to enhancement). 
17 
specifically for the first time and dismissing the enhanced charge based on that subsection 
(R. 147-51). Add.B. 
This series of events makes clear that the parties had no meaningful notice of or 
opportunity to address the trial judge's concerns about subsection (2)(B). Although the 
judge initially scheduled oral argument, he did so without mention of subsection (2)(B) 
specifically. Both parties clearly felt that whatever concern rule 9-301 may have held for 
the judge was settled by issuance of Marshall and Soto because, despite ample 
opportunity and multiple arguments thereafter, the parties both failed to mention the rule. 
Moreover, the prosecutor's request for reconsideration specifically pointed the trial judge 
to footnote nine in Marshall, and defendant made no attempt to argue that it did not apply 
to this case, establishing that the parties in fact believed that any issue with regard to rule 
9-301 had been resolved and was not relevant to a decision on the motion to dismiss in 
this case (R. 153-68). However, the judge accepted the parties' written memoranda, took 
the matter under advisement, and thereafter sua sponte ruled on the issue without seeking 
input from the parties. Even in the face of footnote nine, with no opposing argument 
from defendant, the trial judge did not seek argument or input from defendant, but upheld 
his prior ruling (R. 169). Add. C. 
Hence, while the trial court sought oral argument on rule 9-301 at one point, the 
timing and generality of the request, together with the events occurring thereafter, did not 
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give the prosecutor either sufficient notice as to the trial judge's concern or any 
meaningful opportunity for input on Rule 9-301. 
Moreover, the lack of any meaningful opportunity for input is aggravated by the 
fact that the judge faulted the State for an evidentiary failure: the failure to adduce 
evidence the prosecutor did not know was needed on a point the prosecutor did not know 
was at issue. Nothing at or before the evidentiary hearing alerted the prosecutor to the 
need to adduce the requisite evidence. The trial court's numerous reassurances during the 
evidentiary hearing that the burden of proof had shifted from the State to defendant, 
leaving in place the presumption of regularity, prevented the prosecutor from discerning 
any need for additional evidence. Thereafter, no other evidentiary opportunity occurred, 
even if the prosecutor had some reason to believe rule 9-301 had any relevance after 
issuance of the Marshall and Soto opinions. 
The trial judge's attempt to distinguish Marshall leaves unchanged the fact the he 
has done exactly what Marshall prohibits. Marshall is binding on the trial court. See 
Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) ("The Court of 
Appeals has state-wide jurisdiction, and its rulings . . . are binding state-wide, whether 
those rulings are constitutionally based or not."). 
"The expeditious disposition of criminal business and the rendering of justice 
require that courts be fair and reasonable not only to the defendant, but to the state and its 
citizens, represented by the prosecutor, as well." State v. Gooding, 453 A.2d 774, 781 
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(Conn. Supp. 1982). Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court 
was not at liberty to raise the uncontested issue sua sponte and base its decision on that 
issue without some specific notice to and a meaningful opportunity for input from the 
parties. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 567 (Al. App. 1988) (trial court erred in 
unexpectedly resolving case on basis of a witness5 affidavit alone where neither party had 
notice of the court's intent to take such action or an opportunity to respond to the 
information in the affidavit); Gooding, 453 A.2d at 780-81 (by acting sua sponte without 
notice to counsel or an opportunity to be heard, the trial court "denied a basic right to 
each party to a fair hearing in a judicial proceeding" and "denied the state its 
constitutional right to due process," rendering the action of the court illegal and void); 
People v. Anderson, 817 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (111. App. 2004), appeal pending (Jan. Term 
2005) (courts may not "deny litigants notice and the opportunity to first be heard on the 
issues raised by the court on its own motion"); Commonwealth v. Pachipko, 677 A.2d 
1247, 1249-50 (Pa.Super 1996) (finding error in the trial court's grant of defendant's pre-
trial habeas petition based on an uncontested issue not raised by the parties and without 
notice or an opportunity to the prosecution to defend), appeal den 'd 687 A.2d 377 (Pa. 
1997); State v. Salinas, 975 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tx. App. 1998) (trial court erred in 
dismissing case on a ground not timely raised where the State was not provided with prior 
notice and a meaningful hearing on the issue); see also United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 
1025, 1033-34 (10th Cir.1978) (holding that trial court erred when, at a sua sponte status 
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hearing, it allowed defendant to raise a speedy trial challenge summarily and dismissed 
the case without prior notice to or opportunity to defend by the State). 
Because the trial judge erroneously decided this matter, dismissal of the enhanced 
charged amounts to an abuse of discretion and warrants remand for further proceedings. 
C. Regardless, the Absence of Proof That the Prior Pleas were in Fact 
Involuntary Prevents Dismissal 
Even if the judge could properly raise the issue sua sponte, it does not follow, on 
these facts, that the absence of evidence of compliance with subsection (2)(B) establishes 
that the pleas were, in fact, unknowing or involuntary. See Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, 
121 n.9; see also Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) (to prevail in a 
collateral attack on a guilty plea, defendant must show that the guilty plea was in fact not 
knowing and voluntary). Defendant claimed only that he was not informed of his right to 
counsel and of the potential enhancements. The trial court rejected these claims and 
found that defendant had told the Grand County Circuit Court judge he understood his 
rights (R. 150). Add. B. The record also shows that defendant signed the 
acknowledgment in Grand County (R. 186: 50). In the Emery County case, the record 
shows that defendant told the court he understood English and that he understood his 
rights after each was stated to him (R. 186: 21-22, 35). Defendant submitted no proof 
below of any lack of understanding. Hence, even if one of the pleas did not comply with 
rule 9-301(2)(B), dismissal is not warranted on these facts where defendant has not 
established that his pleas were in fact unknowing or involuntary, as is required before a 
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collateral attack will work to invalidate the prior guilty pleas. See Marshall, 2003 UT 
App 381, If 21 n.9; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992.6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's order dismissing the felony charge against defendant and remand the matter 
for further proceedings. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
This Court has discretion "to determine which matters require oral argument, 
which decisions require a full opinion, and which do not." Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 
UT 25, f 16. Here, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument. 
Cf. Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). In addition, this case presents a novel question of law. 
Therefore, the State requests oral argument and a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / clay of February, 2005. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney/General 
[S C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
6If, arguendo, the failure to comply with subsection (2)(B) constituted proof of an 
unknowing or involuntary plea, the fact remains that the evidence suggests that the 
subsection was, in fact, complied with in each of the Justice Courts, and a remand is 
necessary to provide the parties an opportunity to address the issue and adduce the forms 
that bear on the issue. 
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Sidwell Taylor, attorney for defendant/appellee, 20 South Main Street, Helper, Utah 




125 TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-44 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or par t of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(e) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse t reatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
(hi) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse t reatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines tha t substance 
abuse t rea tment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if i t is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) a t any t ime after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 tha t is com-
mitted after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section tha t is committed after 
Ju ly 1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of 
this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution 
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
t rea tment a t a substance abuse t reatment program providing intensive 
care or inpatient t reatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after t rea tment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection 
(13). - • . -
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not1 eligible for parole or 
probation unti l any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) t ha t require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate > in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational'series; obtain, in the 
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discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, manda to -
rily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and 
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse t r ea tmen t in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(i) complete all court ordered: 
(A) screening and assessment; 
(B) educational series; 
(C) substance abuse treatment; and 
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and t reat-
ment costs. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend 
the person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-
221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall s tate for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection wi th 
the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts t h a t shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting t he plea 
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant , arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first t ime under Subsection (2); * 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person h a s a prior 
conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is commit-
ted within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; 
and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered 'by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3^223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
a combination of both or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of 
blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment 
— Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Sus-
pens ion or revocation of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless 
driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled 
substance tha t is taken illegally in the body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or 
a combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance 
with Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) s ta tutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, 
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this 
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; ± 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained a t a 
substance abuse program tha t is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse 
program tha t is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily uiiury tha t creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program tha t is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
and Mental Heal th in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(f) "substance abuse t reatment program" means a state licensed sub-
stance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi^ 
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise tha t degree of care tha t an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this s ta te if the person: 
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(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body tha t a subsequent chemical tes t 
shows tha t the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree tha t renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milHUters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
'(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 
years of age in the vehicle a t the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
«another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner.
 f 
(4) (a) As par t of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or par t of a jail sentence, 
require the person, to: ' ' 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
48 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
3i
 (c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: - ? 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse t reatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse t reatment 
if the substance abuse t reatment program determines tha t substance 
abuse t reatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
' (ii) If there is admissible evidence tha t the 'person had a blood 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). • ,. * -} * 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
'pr ior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
/impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
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was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for 
a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law en-
forcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) tha t a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so tha t the person's compliance with the court's order may 
be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to in-
clude a substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during 
the time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions tha t allow the person 
to at tend school educational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement 
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers 
by the court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation 
provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, 
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and 
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete tha t 
sentence or those conditions or orders. 
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(d) (i) The court may waive all or par t of the costs associated wi th 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shal l 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence tha t the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
then if the court does not order: 
(a) t reatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), t h e n 
the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the 
record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of elec-
tronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, 
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, 
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, 
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; 
1988, ch. 17, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990, 
ch. 299, § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, ch. 168, 
§ 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; 
1994, ch. 159, § 1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1; 1996, 
ch. 71, § 1; 1996, ch. 220, § 1; 1996, ch. 223, 
§ 2; 1997, ch. 68, § 1; 1998, ch. 13, § 46; 1998, 
ch. 94, § 1; 1998, ch. 168, § 1; 1999, ch. 33, 
§ 1; 1999, ch. 226, § 1; 1999, ch. 258, § 1; 
2000, ch. 333, § 1; 2000, ch. 334, § 1; 2001, 
ch. 64, § 1; 2001, ch. 289, § 1; 2001, ch. 309, 
§ 1; 2001, ch. 355, § 1; 2002, ch. 8, § 1; 2002, 
ch.54,§ 1; 2002, ch. 106, § 1; 2002 (5th S.S.), 
ch. 8, § 10. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment by ch 226, effective May 3, 1999, deleted 
Subsection (6)(aXi), making class A misdemean-
ors an alternative classification; deleted Sub-
sections (6)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), relating to three 
and two prior convictions, respectively; deleted 
former Subsection (6)(b), relating to fines, jail 
sentences, and alternatives to jail sentences; 
inserted "or 53-3-231" in Subsection (ll)(b); and 
made designation and stylistic changes. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 258, effective 
May 3,1999, rewrote Subsection (2)(a)(i), which 
read "has a blood or breath alcohol concentra-
tion of .08 grams or greater as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control," and 
made stylistic changes. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 33, effective July 
1, 1999, added Subsections (4)(b)(ii) and 
(5)(b)(ii), making related changes; inserted "or 
home confinement" in Subsections (4)(c) and 
(5)(c); added Subsections (6)(d) (Subsection 
(6)(c) in the reconciled version) and (13); and 
made related changes throughout the section 
The 2000 amendment by ch. 333, effective 
May 1, 2000, substituted "a substance abuse 
testing instrument" for "an alcohol detection 
breathalyzer" in Subsection (13)(d)(i) and 
added Subsection (14) (Subsection (15) in the 
reconciled version). 
The 2000 amendment by ch. 334, effective 
May 1, 2000, rewrote the section, adding provi-
sions for educational series, substance abuse 
screenings and assessments, substance abuse 
treatment programs, and supervised probation 
and added Subsection (14). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 64, effective 
April 30, 2001, in Subsection (6)(a), added the 
(i) designation, deleted "third or subsequent" 
before "conviction," substituted "violation of 
Subsection (2)" for "violation," added Subsec-
tion (6)(a)(ii), and made stylistic changes. 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 289, effective 
April 30, 2001, made the same changes as ch. 
64 and also substituted "ten years" for "six 
years" in Subsections (5Xa), (6)(a)(i), and 
(llXaXii). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 355, effective 
April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(e), added "(i) 
Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii)" and 
added Subsection (4)(e)(ii) and in Subsection 
(14)(a) added the reference to Section 41-6-44.6. 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 309, effective 
July 1, 2001, added Subsection (3)(a)(ii)(C) and 
inserted "or two years" in Subsection (12)(a). 
The 2002 amendment by ch. 8, effective May 
6, 2002, redesignated former Subsection (l)(a) 
as Subsection (l)(b), and former Subsection 
(l)(b) as (IXa), substituting "conviction" for 
"prior conviction"; added Subsections (l)(a)(iii) 
and (l)(a)(vi), redesignating subsections ac-
cordingly; in Subsection (6), added Subsection 
(b), making related and stylistic changes; added 
"or if the person has a prior conviction as 
denned under Subsection (1)" in Subsection 
(ll)(a)(ii); and substituted "alcohol, any drug, 
or combination of both-related" for "alcohol-
related" throughout. 
The 2002 amendment by ch. 54, effective May 
6, 2002, substituted "48 hours" for "24 hours" in 
Subsection (4)(b)(i); substituted "if the court 
ARTICLE 3. CRIMINAL PRACTICE 
RULE 9-301. RECORD OF ARRAIGNMENT AND CONVICTION 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for justice courts to follow in making a record at the 
time of arraignment and conviction in those cases where the defendant may be 
subject to an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same offense in the future. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the justice courts in those cases where the defendant may 
be subject to an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same offense in the future. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of arraignment, the justice court judge shall determine whether 
the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same 
offense in the future. 
(2) If the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty, upon the entry of a 
plea of guilty, the justice court judge shall: 
(A) Advise the defendant, orally and in writing of the defendant's rights, the 
elements of the charged offense, the penalties for the charged offense, and the 
enhancement penalty which may be imposed in the event the defendant is 
convicted of the same offense in the future; and 
(B) Require the defendant to sign a statement acknowledging that the defen-
dant understands his rights and that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
waives those rights. 
(3) Upon the entry of a guilty plea or receipt of a conviction, the justice court 
judge shall execute a written and signed judgment of conviction and forward the 
appropriate information and/or fingerprints to the state agencies responsible for 
maintaining criminal records. 
Addendum B 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN ANID 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES 
Defendant 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No, 021700135 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss Third Degree Felony on 
November 18,2002. On December 5,2002, the defendant filed a Motion for Hearing along with 
a Notice of Motion also regarding the Motion to Dismiss. The State filed an objection to 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss on January 7, 2003. Defendant, by and through counsel of 
record, filed a second Memorandum Regarding Motion to Dismiss by FAX on January 8,2003, 
the original being filed on January 10, 2003. The Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's 
Second Memorandum to Dismiss on January 21, 2003. 
At the preliminary hearing scheduled on October 16, 2002, both counsel indicated that 
a Motion to Dismiss would be forth coming and that the disposition of that Motion to Dismiss may 
vitiate the need for a trial. The Court, at the scheduled preliminary hearing date of October 
16th, scheduled written memorandums in this matter to be filed by defense counsel by November 18, 
2002. The State's response thereto to be filed by December 18,2002, and defense counsel then had4 
until January 2, 2003, to file a reply. The Court notes the disparity between scheduled and actual 
filings herein. The Court in response to Defendant's Motion for Hearing scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing to be held on January 28,2003. The evidentiary hearing was held on said date and the Court 
took under advisement the motion in order to read the case law suggested by counsel. 
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Having now reviewed the case law as well as the pleadings herein, the Court finds as follows: 
The state of Utah had marked for identification and offered as exhibits 1 and 2 respectively herein the 
certified copies of the Emery County Justice Court, Green River Division judgement of February 14, 
2001, and of the Grand County Justice Court judgement of September 15, 1997. Upon receipt of 
those documents by the Court, the state suggested that it was then up to the defendant to raise 
questions as to the propriety or impropriety of the prior proceedings and it was the burden of the 
defendant to establish the impropriety of the prior proceedings by some evidence, at which time the 
burden would re-shift to the state to show that proper procedures were adhered to by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The defendant, rather than offering specific evidence on the state's 
errors, chose to call the two Justice Court Judges as witnesses to show non-compliance. The Court, 
in an attempt to economize the judicial time necessary, allowed leeway on the part of both parties in 
their examination and/or cross examination of the witnesses so that they need not be recalled unless, 
after the defendant testified, the state wished to rebut any or all of the defendant's statements. 
Having heard all of the testimony of the Justice Court Judges as well as the defendant in the 
above entitled matter I conclude that the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant waived his right to counsel in both proceedings before the two Justice Court Judges. 
The defendant only proved that he was not represented by counsel in either case. From his testimony 
there was at least an inference that he did not waive counsel. The inference arising from his testimony 
that he didn't remember either judge advising him of a right to counsel, or asking whether he waived 
such right as well as the alleged (his testimony) shortness of time (10 minutes) he remembered the 
whole process took in front of Judge Burnes. 
The Court believes that I must address Sua Sponte the question of compliance by the Justice 
Court Judges with Rule 9-301, URJA. Neither Judge had evidence of a written advisory of rights and 
enhancement possibilities required under Rule 9-301 (2)(A), Judge Cox's policy was to give such 
written notice to defendant, but to destroy evidence thereof upon completion of each case, only 
retaining the Citation, Information and Judgement. His testimony did not confirm what he specifically 
did in this case, nor should we expect such specific memory after such a long time. 
Judge Burnes said no copy of a Written Notice was in the file so she thought one had not been 
given defendant although she had forms (as did Judge Cox) that made such explanations. Counsel 
reviewed these forms and I believe defense counsel referred to language therein in her examination 
of her client. However, neither counsel offered the forms as exhibits herein. 
I agree with Judge Bryner's decision in State of Utah vs. Jose Luis Telles, 021700133, 
especially, that the Judicial Council meant for the failure of compliance with the Rule to have some 
consequence. I therefore urge Justice Courts to issue and retain copies of such document(s). 
However, they are only evidence of compliance. Judge Cox testimony preponderates that compliance 
occurred. Judge Burnes testimony creates some doubt about compliance. Although no copy was in 
file; her specific recollections convince the Court that plaintiff was advised about his rights and 
enhancements. However, since the forms were not offered, and I don't know whether the forms 
have provision for defendant's signature, I cannot conclude anything about the adequacy of the form 
to comply with Rule 9-301(2)(B) URJA. 
I conclude therefore that in this case the State did not meet its burden of proving compliance 
with Rule 9-301 URJA and therefore the prior judgements may not be used to enhance the 
punishments and/or degree of offense provided for by multiple convictions under Utah Law. 
The Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted and the case as charged dismissed no prejudice 
to the State should Attach and the State may file a lesser offense if it feels same is justified herein. 
The Court has heard testimony by the Judges of their normal procedures and to the best of 
their recollection the actual procedure followed with this defendant. 
I also heard this defendant's testimony that when the first conviction occurred in Moab, he 
was more deficient in his language skills than presently but, he could not say whether or not counsel 
was offered or whether he waived counsel. The procedure that the Moab Justice testified to 
convinces the Court that the defendant was, in fact, advised of his constitutional rights, that at the 
time of entering his plea he was asked if he understood and indicated to the Judge that he did 
understand at which time the Judge went forward with the imposition of sentence therein. The Justice 
in the Green River case also testified as to her normal procedure as well as her specific recollection 
with regard to this defendant. Her specific recollection was that he appeared with another individual 
not during her normal arraignment, and that she specifically recalls asking this defendant about his 
constitutional rights and delineated the procedure which she normally went through and to which she 
recalled going through with this defendant. 
The defendant's testimony, to some extent, contradicts the Judge's recollection, in that he 
claims that a very short period of time was all that was needed for the Judge to go through the 
procedure. He further claimed that he and his friend arrived on the day of the normal arraignment 
calendar but after the time that was originally set. This partially confirms the Judge's recollection, 
but does not substantiate the specific recollection of the Judge that she, on this particular occasion, 
went through the arraignment procedure specifically with this defendant since he claims that it was 
such a short period of time that the Judge took with him in accomplishing the entry of plea, 
sentencing, and making provision for time payments. Both Judges testified that it was and is the 
policy of each Judge at the time of imposing sentence to advise the defendant that subsequent 
convictions could be used to enhance the penalties which might be imposed in the event that similar 
changes were incurred in the future. That specific aspect of their testimony was again only 
-i K n 
inferentially controverted by the defendant's testimony as to the shortness of the arraignment, plea, 
and sentencing which took place before the Green River Justice Court Judge Both the presumption 
of regularity and the evidence preponderates to the contrary and I would normally deny the Motion 
to Dismiss but for the Rule 9-301 alluded to earlier. 
This Court further concludes that the records of a "non Record Court" are nevertheless 
records available to the prosecution and others as evidence of elements of the subsequently charged 
violation/enhancement, see Judge Bryner's decision in State vs. Telles, Supra. The requested relief 
relative to this issue is therefore denied. 
Although the ruling herein is limited to this case the Court requests counsel for the state to 
consider the application of Rule 9-301 on case #01170054. State vs Mario Soto, and whether the 
evidence/forms, etc, will preponderate in favor of the state or defendant. 
Dated this day of July, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
151 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a signed copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS on the j 4 & day of July, 2004, to the following: 
David A Blackweli, Emery County Attorney, PO Box 249, Castle Dale, UT 84513 
Margret Sidwell Taylor, Attorney at Law, 20 S Main Street, Helper, UT 84526 
Clerk/Depirfy) Court Clerk 
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David A. Blackwell (4542) 
Emery County Attorney 
W. Brent Langston (4614) 
Deputy Emery County Attorney 
PO Box 249 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
Telephone: (435)381-2543 
Fax: (435)381-2735 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES 
DOB: 08/26/1974 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Criminal No. 021700135 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
CA No. 02-0892 
COMES NOW W. Brent Langston, Deputy Emery County Attorney, and asks the Court to 
reconsider its ruling in this matter in light of the express ruling to the contrary in State v. Marshall. 
Specifically, the defendant in that case raised the issue of the applicability of Rule 9-301, Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, to the enhancement issue. In that case, as in Gonzales, the State had no 
written record of strict compliance with the Rule. Footnote 9 of the Marshall case specifically 
addressed defendant's due process claim and stated, "Even assuming defendant did plead guilty to 
the charges culminating in his prior DUI convictions, it does not follow that those pleas would be 
invalidated for enhancement purposes based solely on a failure to comply with Rule 9-301 of the 
FILED 
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Utah Code of Judicial Administration." The footnote goes on to explain the reasons why a failure 
to notify defendant of possible future enhancements does not invalidate his guilty plea. In light of 
the ruling in Marshall, which is directly on point and in view of the Court's ruling that, "Both the 
presumption of regularity and the evidence preponderates to the contrary, and I would normally deny 
the Motion to Dismiss but for the Rule 9-301 alluded to earlier." The only logical and reasonable 
conclusion is that the Court was unaware that Marshall settled the issue of the applicability of Rule 
9-301. The Supreme Court declined to accept certiorari on Marshall so the matter is final, and this 
Court has no authority to overrule a higher court. 
WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests the Court reconsider its ruling and issue a 
ruling on compliance with the Marshall case denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this / A ^ ^ y o f J u l y , 2004. 
r. BR£NT LANGSTC 
Deputy Emery County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the jj$ day of July, 2004 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion was mailed to: 
Margret Sidwell Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
20 South Main 
Helper, UT 84526 
Secretary 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN 
9 
h 
gARBOff EMERY, STATE OF UTAH 
nixu 
AND FOR 6 ?P04 
S E V R P D'STRICT COURTS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
YS. 
ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Case No. 021700135 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
The State of Utah by W. Brent Langston, Deputy Emery County Attorney, has filed a 
Motion to Reconsider the Court's ruling on defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed herein, suggesting 
herein that the Court of Appeals decision and specifically footnote 9, in the case of State of Utah vs. 
Jerry Lynn Marshall is determinative of the Court's concern expressed in the ruling on Motion to 
Dismiss. Specifically that Rule 9-301 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration if not complied 
with would preclude the state from using any convictions in those cases of non-compliance for 
purposes of enhancement going forward. The Court, after reviewing the footnote, and without the 
benefit of argument by counsel, has concluded that the "direct vs. collateral" dichotomy is useful 
with respect to courts of record, but I believe that the judicial council in promulgating the rule had 
in mind the distinction between Justice Courts and Courts of Record, and expected compliance with 
that rule, and I believe they anticipated consequences of non-compliance. The Court has concluded 
in this case that the state failed to prove compliance and therefore I am left with determining what 
consequences non-compliance should have. My determination is that non-compliance with the rule 
should have the effect of preventing the state from using any conviction before a Justice of the Peace 
Court where the evidence does not show by a preponderance that the rule was in fact complied with. 
I note that the rule provides for oral and written specifics and further a signature of the defendant. 
In the case before this Court, to wit the Gonzales case, the state failed to prove that compliance and 
therefore the Court ordered the dismissal and after review confirms that decision as of this date. 
169 
Dated this 6th day of August, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Bruce K. Halliday, Ju< 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the [(p— day of August, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Mr. David A. Blackwell, Emery County Attorney, PO Box 249, Castle Dale, UT 84513 
Ms. Margret Sidwell Taylor, Attorney at Law, 20 S. Main, Helper, UT 84526 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jerry Lynn MARSHALL, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20020829-CA. 
Nov. 14, 2003. 
Background: Defendant was convicted on his 
conditional plea of no contest in the District Court, 
Castle Dale Department, Bryce K. Bryner, J., of 
felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), 
based on enhancement due to two prior DUI 
convictions. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held 
that: 
(1) enhancement of defendant's current DUI 
conviction based on his prior DUI convictions did 
not violate his rights under Ex Post Facto clause of 
Federal Constitution, and 
(2) defendant was not entitled to specific notice at 
time of his prior DUI convictions that those 
offenses could be used to enhance his current DUI 
conviction to third degree felony. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €^>1130(5) 
1 lOkl 130(5) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals would not separately analyze 
defendant's due process and ex post facto claims 
under State Constitution, in prosecution for felony 
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), as 
there was no distinction between protection against 
ex post facto laws provided by State and Federal 
Constitutions, and defendant failed to adequately set 
forth any separate legal analysis under due process 
provision of State Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
Page 1 
[2] Criminal Law €=>l 134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
The propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to dismiss is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. 
[3] Criminal Law €=^1134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Whether legislation violates the ex post facto clause 
of the Federal Constitution is a question of law, 
which appellate court reviews for correctness, 
giving the trial court no deference. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. 
[4] Criminal Law €==>1134(3) 
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Constitutional arguments regarding due process 
present questions of law that appellate court reviews 
for correctness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[5] Constitutional Law €=^203 
92k203 Most Cited Cases 
[5] Sentencing and Punishment €^>1217 
350Hkl217 Most Cited Cases 
Enhancement of defendant's current conviction for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) 
based on his prior DUI convictions did not violate 
his rights under Ex Post Facto clause of Federal 
Constitution; DUI repeat offender statute did not 
retroactively aggravate crimes of defendant's prior 
DUIs, nor did it inflict a greater punishment than 
that attached to those crimes when they were 
committed, defendant's current conviction punished 
him only for current offense, albeit more seriously 
that if he would have committed same offense at 
earlier point in time, and statute did not operate 
retroactively. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(6)(a), 68-3-3. 
[6] Sentencing and Punishment €^>1361 
350Hkl361 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant was not entitled to specific notice at time 
of his prior convictions for driving under the 
influence of alcohol (DUI) that those offenses could 
be used to enhance his current DUI conviction to 
third degree felony, and thus defendant's due 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(Cite as: 81 P.3d 775,2003 UT App 381) 
process right to notice was not violated; it was 
unclear whether procedural rule requiring notice to 
defendant of penalty enhancement possibilities 
upon entry of guilty plea applied outside context of 
determining validity of plea, defendant provided no 
citations to record to support argument that he was 
not advised of possibility of enhancement at time of 
prior convictions, and notice to which defendant 
claimed he was entitled would have been impossible 
to give. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; U.C.A.1953, 
41-6- 44(6)(a); Judicial Administration Rule 
9-301(2). 
[7] Constitutional Law €=^253(4) 
92k253(4) Most Cited Cases 
A violation of the prohibition against ex post facto 
laws necessarily implicates due process concerns, as 
an individual is deprived of fair notice when the 
legislature increases punishment beyond what was 
proscribed when the crime was consummated. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[8] Constitutional Law €==>251.6 
92k251.6 Most Cited Cases 
[8] Constitutional Law €=>258(2) 
92k258(2) Most Cited Cases 
Due process requires, at a minimum, adequate and 
timely notice; this means that a criminal statute 
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are 
subject to it what conduct on their part will render 
them liable to its penalties. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
14. 
[9] Criminal Law €^>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
For a plea to be knowing and voluntary, an accused 
must be fully aware of the direct consequences of a 
guilty plea. 
[10] Criminal Law €==>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
If the consequence flowing from the plea is 
collateral, then defendant need not be informed of it 
before entering the plea; a "collateral consequence" 
is one that is not related to the length or nature of 
the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea. 
*776 Margret Sidwell Taylor, Helper, and W. 
Andrew McCullough, McCullough & Assoc, 
Midvale, for Appellant. 
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Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Kris C. Leonard, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before JACKSON, P. J., BENCH and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
**1 Defendant was charged with felony DUI 
based on enhancement due to two prior DUI 
convictions. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the felony DUI charge, arguing that the 
enhancement provision in the DUI statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to him because it 
violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
The trial court denied his motion. Defendant 
appeals, and we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 The parties stipulated to the facts governing 
this appeal. On April 26, 2002, Defendant 
purchased a twelve-pack of beer at BK's 
convenience store in Huntington, Utah. The 
transaction was witnessed by another customer, 
Sergeant Gayle Jensen of the Emery County 
Sheriffs Department, who noticed that Defendant 
appeared to be intoxicated. Sergeant Jensen told 
Defendant not to drive and suggested that he call a 
friend to pick him up. The Defendant placed a 
phone *777 call, and Sergeant Jensen left. Soon 
after, however, Sergeant Jensen decided to return to 
BK's to ensure that Defendant did not drive. Upon 
his return to BK's, Sergeant Jensen observed 
Defendant drive away. Sergeant Jensen stopped 
Defendant, conducted field sobriety tests, and 
concluded that Defendant was intoxicated. 
Defendant was arrested and given an intoxilyzer 
test, which showed a blood alcohol concentration of 
.25, more than three times the legal limit in Utah. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6- 44(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2003) 
. An open container of alcohol was also found in 
Defendant's vehicle. 
**3 Defendant was charged by information with 
driving under the influence of alcohol and having an 
open alcoholic beverage container in a motor 
vehicle. Because two or more of Defendant's nine 
prior DUI convictions fell within ten years of his 
April 2002 arrest, Defendant's DUI charge was 
enhanced from a class B misdemeanor to a third 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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degree felony pursuant to the 2001 amendment to 
the DUI statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44(3)(a)(i), (6)(a)(i) (Supp.2002). Pursuant to 
that amendment, effective April 30, 2001, a DUI 
conviction is a third degree felony if it occurs 
"within ten years of two or more prior [DUI] 
convictions." Id. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i). Prior to the 
2001 amendment, the felony enhancement provision 
applied to a third conviction within six years. See 
id. §41-6-44(6)(a)(Supp.l999). 
**4 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the felony 
DUI charge. First, Defendant argued that 
enhancement of the offense violated his due process 
rights because in 1995 and 1998, when his prior 
DUI convictions were entered, he was not given 
"notice of the consequences of any future violation" 
and "could not have ... foreseen that in the year 
2001 the Utah State Legislature would pass a law 
by which his [prior] convictions would be used to 
enhance th[e current DUI] charge to a third degree 
felony." Second, Defendant argued that the 2001 
amendment could not be applied retroactively; 
thus, any offense committed prior to its enactment 
could not be used against him for enhancement 
purposes as that would violate the constitutional 
prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
**5 The trial court rejected Defendant's ex post 
facto argument, concluding that "[t]he 2001 
amendment does not affect the status of the 
previous offenses or convictions and does not 
increase their severity or penalty." Rather, the court 
held, the 2001 amendment merely "gives a more 
severe penalty [for the present offense] because of 
the prior convictions." 
**6 As for Defendant's due process argument, the 
trial court noted that Defendant had nearly one 
year's notice that the enhancement provision had 
been amended. Thus, Defendant was on notice as 
of April 30, 2001, the effective date of the 2001 
amendment, [FN1] "that if he committed a DUI 
after that date, his charge could be enhanced by any 
DUI convictions within a [ten] year period prior to 
the latest offense." Thus, the trial court concluded 
that application of the 2001 amendment to his 2002 
offense did not violate Defendant's rights on either 
ex post facto or due process grounds and denied 
Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
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FN1. The trial court mistakenly noted, as 
does the State on appeal, that the effective 
date of the 2001 amendment was July 1, 
2001; however, the amendment actually 
went into effect April 30, 2001. See Utah 
Motor Vehicle Act, ch. 289, § 
41-6-44(6)(a), 2001 Utah Laws 1349, 
1350; amendment notes, Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44 (Supp.2003). Because 
Defendant's DUI arrest occurred on April 
26, 2002, Defendant had nearly one year's 
notice of the 2001 amendment. 
**7 With the trial court's approval, Defendant 
thereafter entered a conditional plea of no contest, 
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial 
of his motion to dismiss the third degree felony DUI 
charge. See generally State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 
938-39 (Utah Ct.App.1988). In exchange for his no 
contest plea, the State dropped the open container 
charge. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3][4] **8 We must determine whether the 
trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to 
dismiss on the basis that the 2001 amendment to the 
DUI statute violates neither the due process nor ex 
post facto provisions *778 of the United States 
Constitution. [FN2] "[T]he propriety of a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss 
is a question of law that we review for correctness." 
Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). 
"[W]hether legislation violates the ex post facto 
clause [ ] of the ... United States Constitution ] is 
also a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, giving the trial court no deference." 
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,1f 37, 40 P.3d 611. 
Likewise, "constitutional arguments regarding ... 
due process present questions of law" that we 
review for correctness. State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 
2001 UT 26,1 8, 21 P.3d 212. Accord State v. 
Frausto, 2002 UT App 259,^ 14, 53 P.3d 486, 
cert, denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2002). 
FN2. As we " 'recognizef ] no distinction 
between the protection against ex post 
facto laws provided by the Utah and the 
United States Constitutions,' " State v. 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2,f 42, 40 P.3d 611 
(citations omitted in original), and as 
Defendant "has not adequately set forth 
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any separate legal analysis" under the due 
process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution, State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 
392 (Utah 1998), we do not separately 
analyze Defendant's state constitutional 
claims. 
ANALYSIS 
[5] **9 Defendant renews his ex post facto and 
due process arguments on appeal, i.e., Defendant 
argues that enhancement of his current DUI offense 
based on his prior DUI convictions violated his 
rights under the ex post facto and due process 
clauses of the United States Constitution. We now 
consider each of Defendant's arguments. 
I. Ex Post Facto 
**10 "Article I, § 10, of the Constitution prohibits 
the States from passing any 'ex post facto Law.' " 
California Dep't ofCorr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 
504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) 
. The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
identified four types of criminal laws that fall within 
the ex post facto prohibition: 
"1st. Every law that makes an action done before 
the passing of the law, and which was innocent 
when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes 
it greater than it was, when committed. 
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and 
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime, when committed. 
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of 
evidence, and receives less, or different, 
testimony, than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offence, in order to convict the 
offender'' 
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522, 120 S.Ct. 
1620, 1627, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) (quoting 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 
L.Ed. 648 (1798)) (emphasis in original). Accord 
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,<f 44, 40 P.3d 611. 
The first and fourth categories are inapplicable 
here. Therefore, with a view to the second and third 
categories, we must decide whether the 2001 
amendment to the DUI law retroactively " 
'aggravates' " Defendant's prior DUI crimes or " 
'inflicts a greater punishment' " than that attached to 
the crimes when they were committed. Id. (citation 
and emphasis omitted). We therefore turn our 
attention to our statutory DUI scheme and the 2001 
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amendment in particular. 
**11 As stated above, two of Defendant's nine 
prior DUIs were used to enhance his tenth and 
current DUI offense to a third degree felony. The 
two prior DUI convictions relevant to this appeal 
occurred in December 1995 and September 1998. 
Our DUI statute has been amended numerous times 
over the years, reflecting society's increased 
intolerance for repeat DUI offenders. For example, 
at the time of Defendant's 1995 offense, &'fourth 
DUI conviction was a third degree felony if 
committed within six years of the prior violations 
and if those violations occurred after April 23, 
1990. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7)(a) (1993). 
At the time of Defendant's 1998 offense, however, a 
third DUI conviction was a third degree felony if 
committed within six years of the prior violations 
and if those violations occurred after July 1, 1996. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (1998). 
**12 In 1999, the Legislature deleted the date 
restriction contained in previous versions of the 
statute; therefore, a third DUI *779 conviction was 
a third degree felony if committed within six years 
of the prior violations, regardless of when those 
violations occurred. See Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp.1999). Finally, in 2001, the 
Legislature amended the statute again, lengthening 
the time frame in which prior DUIs could be used 
for enhancement purposes from six to ten years. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6- 44(6)(a) (Supp.2001). 
Thus, under the 2001 version of the statute-the 
version under which Defendant was most recently 
convicted—a third DUI conviction is a third degree 
felony if committed within ten years of two prior 
DUI convictions, regardless of when those prior 
convictions occurred. See id. 
**13 Defendant argues that the 2001 amendment, 
as applied to him, constitutes a violation of the 
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 
because it takes into account offenses committed 
before its enactment for purposes of enhancement. 
As a way of avoiding the felony enhancement 
provision of the 2001 statute, Defendant urges us to 
graft the cut-off date of the 1998 version of the 
statute onto the current version. Thus, under 
Defendant's view, the 2001 DUI statute should be 
read to allow felony enhancement only if Defendant 
was convicted of a third DUI within ten years of the 
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prior DUIs, and only if those DUIs occurred after 
July 1, 1996. [FN3] But see Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (Supp.2001) (containing no cut-off 
date and stating simply M[a DUI] conviction ... is a 
third degree felony if it is committed ... within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions under this 
section"). Of course, using the July 1, 1996 cut-off 
date would mean that Defendant's December 1995 
DUI conviction could not be used to enhance his 
current DUI offense, for which he was convicted on 
October 1, 2002. We decline to adopt Defendant's 
peculiar interpretation of the 2001 statute, however, 
because we find no constitutional infirmity under 
the ex post facto clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
FN3. This position is inherently 
inconsistent with Defendant's general 
argument, which is that the 2001 
amendment is an ex post facto law because 
it takes into account offenses committed 
before its enactment for purposes of 
enhancement. If, as Defendant suggests, a 
statute is rendered constitutionally infirm if 
it "looks back" to offenses committed 
before its enactment, such infirmity would 
not be cured by looking back only six 
years instead often. 
**14 The United States Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld the constitutionality of recidivist 
statutes, explaining that "[a]n enhanced sentence 
imposed on a persistent offender ... 'is not to be 
viewed as [an] additional penalty for the earlier 
crimes' but as 'a stiffened penalty for the latest 
crime, which is considered to be an aggravated 
offense because a repetitive one.' " Monge v. 
California, 524 U.S. 721, 728, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 
2250, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998) (quoting Gryger v. 
Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 1258, 92 
L.Ed. 1683 (1948)). See also Nichols v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1927, 
128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) ("Enhancement statutes, 
whether in the nature of criminal history provisions 
... or recidivist statutes that are commonplace in 
state criminal laws, do not change the penalty 
imposed for the earlier conviction.... '[T]his Court 
consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as 
penalizing only the last offense committed by the 
defendant.' ") (citation omitted); Parke v. Raley, 
506 U.S. 20, 26-27, 113 S.Ct. 517, 521-22, 121 
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L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (noting that "[s]tatutes that 
punish recidivists more severely than first offenders 
have a long tradition in this country that dates back 
to colonial times"; "[s]uch laws currently are in 
effect in all 50 States"; "[s]tates have a valid 
interest in deterring and segregating habitual 
criminals"; and "we have repeatedly upheld 
recidivism statutes 'against contentions that they 
violate constitutional strictures dealing with double 
jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual 
punishment, due process, equal protection, and 
privileges and immunities' ") (quoting Spencer v. 
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560, 87 S.Ct. 648, 651, 17 
L.Ed.2d 606 (1967)) (other citations omitted). [FN4] 
FN4. Some of the United States Supreme 
Court cases we cite here are not 
necessarily pristine ex post facto cases, but 
they nevertheless apply by analogy. 
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 118 
S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998), for 
example, was a double jeopardy case, but 
its reasoning is applicable here, where 
Defendant argues that the 2001 
amendment operates to punish him (again) 
for conduct that occurred before its 
enactment. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 
123 S.Ct. 1140, 1149, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 
(2003) (noting relationship between ex 
post facto and double jeopardy 
jurisprudence). 
*780 **15 While Utah appellate courts have not 
had occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the 
2001 amendment to the DUI statute in the face of 
an ex post facto challenge, [FN5] the Utah Supreme 
Court has upheld recidivist statutes under analogous 
circumstances. One such case is particularly 
instructive. In Zeimer v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 232, 
381 P.2d 721 (1963), the defendant challenged his 
conviction as a habitual criminal, stemming from 
violations occurring in 1949 and 1955. See id. at 
722. Like Utah's DUI statute, the habitual criminal 
statute had been amended to allow for stiffer 
penalties for recidivists. See id. at 722-23. Under 
the 1950 version of the statute, the defendant's 1949 
offense could not be considered in determining his 
status as a habitual criminal, but under the 1951 
version, it could. See id. The defendant argued that 
his conviction under the 1951 version of the statute 
was illegal, as it took into account an offense that 
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occurred before its enactment. See id. at 723. The 
Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
explaining that 
FN5. Numerous other jurisdictions have 
rejected ex post facto challenges to 
enhancement statutes that take into account 
prior DUI convictions. See State v. 
Yellowmexican, 142 Ariz. 205, 688 P.2d 
1097, 1099 (Ct.App.1984) (citing cases 
from other jurisdictions and stating that 
"[e]nhanced punishment statutes for repeat 
offenders have been consistently upheld 
against arguments that they violate ex post 
facto proscriptions" and holding that, in 
the case before it, "[t]he punishment 
imposed under [the Arizona DWI 
recidivist statute] is based on the third 
DWI [and] does not increase the penalty 
for the [two] prior convictions"), approved 
en banc by 142 Ariz. 91, 688 P.2d 983 
(1984); Roberts v. State, 494 A.2d 156, 
157 (Del. 1985) (holding that "the 
mandatory sentencing provision of the 
statute is not an ex post facto law as it 
applies to this defendant, since the 
enhanced punishment could be invoked 
only after a second offense, and, in this 
case, the second offense took place after 
the statute had been amended"); Botkin v. 
Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 292, 295 
(Ky.1994) (rejecting defendants' ex post 
facto challenge and holding, "[h]ere the 
offenders are not being punished for 
crimes committed prior to the effective 
date of the [enhancement] statute, but for a 
crime committed thereafter, albeit they 
received a greater punishment by reason of 
their status as prior offenders for other 
driving under the influence offenses"); 
Bailey v. State, 728 So.2d 1070, 1074 
(Miss. 1997) (upholding enhancement 
statute and stating: "The statute regarding 
third-offense DUI charges has not been 
changed such that [defendant] would be 
receiving a stronger punishment than that 
enumerated in the statute at the time 
[defendant] committed his third DUI [;] ... 
therefore, the ex post facto analysis is 
inapplicable."); State v. Brander, 280 
Mont. 148, 930 P.2d 31, 35 (1996) 
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(rejecting defendant's ex post facto 
challenge and stating that "the increase in 
punishment at issue here is a consequence 
of [defendant's] present offense only and 
this enhancement neither punishes any 
previous conduct nor increases the penalty 
for any prior conviction of DUI[; rather,] 
the enhancement of [defendant's] present 
DUI to felony status is nothing more nor 
less than current punishment for his 
repetitive drunk driving offense"); State v. 
Hansen, 258 Neb. 752, 605 N.W.2d 461, 
464 (2000) (upholding enhancement 
statute and stating: "In the instant case, 
[defendant] is not receiving additional 
punishment for his previous convictions, 
but he is being penalized under the newly 
amended statutory scheme for persisting in 
committing the offense of DUI."); State v. 
Edwards, 302 S.C. 492, 397 S.E.2d 88, 89 
(1990) (rejecting defendant's argument 
"that the legislature did not intend for the 
1988 amendment to apply 'retroactively' to 
allow consideration of his 1983 conviction 
[in determining the degree of his current 
DUI offense]" because "the clear and 
unambiguous language of the amendment 
indicates that the new 10 year period is to 
be used in determining the degree of any 
DUI committed on or after January 1, 
1989"). 
[t]he habitual criminal statute will apply only 
upon a conviction of the criminal offense last 
charged. Its invocation does not inflict additional 
or further punishment for the prior convictions or 
impose a new punishment therefor. It only serves 
to make more severe the punishment for the last 
or subsequent offense which might be imposed 
because of the previous convictions. 
Our habitual criminal statute does not require that 
the prior convictions of an accused be subsequent 
to its enactment or amendments thereto. It has 
been generally held that a state may enact such 
statutes that would consider and apply 
convictions occurring prior to their enactment. 
Id at 723-24 (citations omitted). Cf State v. 
Coleman, 540 P.2d 953, 953-54 (Utah 1975) 
(holding that defendant, who was "convicted of 
assault with a deadly weapon in the year 1969," 
could lawfully be charged with "possession of a 
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dangerous weapon by a convicted person" because 
the latter offense occurred *781 after the applicable 
statute was enacted in 1973, and because "[t]he 
statute ... only has prospective application and in no 
way affects the 1969 conviction"). 
**16 In the instant case, the 2001 amendment does 
not retroactively " 'aggravate[ ]' " the crimes of 
Defendant's 1995 and 1998 DUIs, nor does it " 
'inflict[ ] a greater punishment1 " than that attached 
to those crimes when they were committed. 
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522, 120 S.Ct. 
1620, 1627, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) (quoting 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 
L.Ed. 648 (1798)) (emphasis omitted). Accord 
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,1f 44, 40 P.3d 611. 
The 2001 amendment went into effect April 30, 
2001, see supra note 1, and Defendant committed 
the current DUI offense on April 26, 2002. 
Defendant's current conviction punishes him only 
for the April 2002 offense, albeit more seriously 
than if he would have committed the same offense 
at an earlier point in time. For these reasons, 
Defendant's ex post facto challenge is unavailing. 
[FN6] 
FN6. We reject Defendant's argument 
under Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) for 
the same reasons. Section 68-3-3 states: 
"No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
The 2001 amendment does not operate 
retroactively; therefore, it comports with 
section 68-3-3. 
II. Due Process 
[6][7][8] **17 We now address the separate but 
closely related issue of whether application of the 
2001 amendment violated Defendant's 
constitutional right to due process. [FN7] "Due 
process requires, at a minimum, adequate and 
timely notice." In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327, 332 
(Utah 1997). This means that a criminal statute 
must be " 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who 
are subject to it what conduct on their part will 
render them liable to its penalties.' " Bouie v. 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct 1697, 1701, 
12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (quoting Connally v. 
General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 
126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). 
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FN7. A violation of the prohibition against 
ex post facto laws necessarily implicates 
due process concerns, as an individual is 
deprived of "fair notice ... when the 
legislature increases punishment beyond 
what was proscribed when the crime was 
consummated." Weaver v. Graham, 450 
U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 965, 67 
L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). We have already 
determined that the 2001 amendment is not 
an ex post facto law. In this section, then, 
we treat Defendant's due process claim 
only insofar as it is advanced on a footing 
independent of his ex post facto argument. 
**18 Defendant, who has managed to garner nine 
previous DUI convictions, does not argue that, at 
the time of the instant DUI offense, he was without 
notice that his conduct was prohibited by law. 
Indeed, any such argument would be unsuccessful, 
as it is well-settled that "[i]gnorance ... of [the] law 
is no defense to a crime." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-304(2) (1999). Thus, Defendant was deemed 
to be on notice of the 2001 amendment to the DUI 
law, and the legal consequences thereof, as of its 
effective date of April 30, 2001, see Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act, ch. 289, § 41-6-44(6)(a), 2001 Utah 
Laws 1349, 1350, which was nearly one year before 
Defendant's current DUI offense, committed on 
April 26, 2002. 
**19 Instead, Defendant maintains that, at the time 
of his 1995 and 1998 convictions, he was 
constitutionally entitled to "specific notice" that 
those convictions could later be used to enhance a 
subsequent DUI offense to a third degree felony. 
The United States Supreme Court responded to a 
similar argument in Nichols v. United States, 511 
U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994). 
In Nichols, the defendant argued that "at a 
minimum, due process requires a misdemeanor 
defendant to be warned that his conviction might be 
used for enhancement purposes should the 
defendant later be convicted of another crime." Id. 
at 748, 114 S.Ct. at 1928. The Court disagreed, 
stating: 
No such requirement was suggested in Scott [v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 
383 (1979)], and we believe with good reason. In 
the first place, a large number of misdemeanor 
convictions take place in police or justice courts 
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which are not courts of record. Without a drastic 
change in the procedures of these courts, there 
would be no way to memorialize any such 
warning. Nor is it at all clear exactly how 
expansive the warning would have to be; would a 
Georgia court *782 have to warn the defendant 
about permutations and commutations of 
recidivist statutes in 49 other States, as well as the 
criminal history provision of the Sentencing 
Guidelines applicable in federal courts? And a 
warning at the completely general level-that if he 
is brought back into court on another criminal 
charge, a defendant such as Nichols will be 
treated more harshly-would merely tell him what 
he must surely already know. [FN8] 
FN8. Many other courts have echoed the 
Supreme Court's statements in Nichols, 
rejecting the notion that a criminal 
defendant is constitutionally entitled to 
specific notice that the instant conviction 
may later be used for enhancement 
purposes should the defendant be 
convicted of a subsequent crime. See State 
v. Chapman, 685 A.2d 423, 425 (Me. 1996) 
(rejecting defendant's argument that her 
prior DUI convictions could not be 
considered for purposes of enhancement 
and holding that "[defendant's due process 
claim fails [because a]fter the effective 
date of the amendment [to the DUI law], 
defendant had fair notice that a conviction 
for operating under the influence would 
subject her to the currently defined 
penalty"); State v. Zoellner, 920 S.W.2d 
132, 135-36 (Mo.Ct.App. 1996) (rejecting 
defendant's due process argument that he " 
'had no reason to believe nor did he know 
that by entering pleas to two [prior DUI 
charges], that he was "two-thirds of the 
way" to a felony offense' " and stating that 
"a trial court is not required to inform a 
defendant who pleads guilty that the 
legislature may amend the law in the 
future"); State v. Arguello, 655 N.W.2d 
451, 452-53 (S.D.2002) (per curiam) 
(rejecting defendant's due process 
argument that "because he was not 
informed that [his two prior DUI] 
convictions could subsequently be used to 
enhance his [current DUI] sentence they 
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are void for enhancement purposes" and 
stating that "[a] 'defendant is not entitled, 
as a constitutional right, ... to information 
regarding the future use of his conviction 
for purposes of enhancement' ") (quoting 
Presley v. State, 498 So.2d 832, 833 
(Miss. 1986)); State v. Edwards, 302 S.C. 
492, 397 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (1990) 
(rejecting defendant's due process 
argument and stating: "The inquiry is not 
whether appellant had notice of the 1988 
amendment at the time of his 1983 
conviction, but whether he had fair notice 
of the amendment when he committed the 
current offense on February 3, 1989. 
Because the current offense took place 
after the effective date of the amendment, 
appellant clearly had notice that his 1983 
conviction would be considered in 
determining his punishment for the current 
offense. Therefore, appellant's due process 
rights have not been violated."). 
Id Defendant cites rule 9-301 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration to support his due process 
argument. Rule 9-301 applies to "justice courts in 
those cases where the defendant may be subject to 
an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same 
offense in the future." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 
R9-301. In such cases, the rule states that, "upon 
the entry of a plea of guilty, the justice court judge 
shall [a]dvise the defendant, orally and in writing of 
the defendant's rights, the elements of the charged 
offense, the penalties for the charged offense, and 
the enhancement penalty which may be imposed in 
the event the defendant is convicted of the same 
offense in the future." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 
R9-301(2)-(2)(A). 
**20 It is unclear, first of all, whether rule 9-301 
applies outside of the context of determining the 
validity of a criminal defendant's guilty plea. 
Defendant does not state whether or not he pled 
guilty in connection with the 1995 conviction, but 
merely alleges that the offense "was prosecuted in 
the Justice Court as a Class B misdemeanor" and 
that he was not given "specific notice" of the 
possibility of third degree felony enhancement for 
subsequent DUI convictions. 
[9] [10] **21 Additionally, Defendant provides no 
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citations to the record to support his argument that 
he was not advised of the possibility of 
enhancement at the time of his prior convictions. 
[FN9] Defendant instead argues *783 that M[t]he 
State has not provided written evidence to prove 
that Defendant was so advised," but it is 
Defendant's burden, not the State's, to provide 
citations to the record to support his legal 
arguments on appeal. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) 
("The brief of the appellant shall contain ... citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on."). 
FN9. Even assuming Defendant did plead 
guilty to the charges culminating in his 
prior DUI convictions, it does not follow 
that those pleas would be invalidated for 
enhancement purposes based solely on a 
failure to comply with rule 9-301 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. It is 
well-settled that 
failure to comply with [procedural rules, 
including] rule 11 [of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure] in taking a guilty plea 
does not in itself amount to a violation of a 
defendant's rights under either the Utah or 
the United States Constitution. To 
[collaterally attack a conviction], a 
petitioner must show more than a violation 
of the prophylactic provisions of [a 
procedural rule]; he or she must show that 
the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and 
voluntary. 
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 
(Utah 1993). For a plea to be knowing and 
voluntary, "an accused must be 'fully 
aware of the direct consequences' of a 
guilty plea." State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 
1303, 1304 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 
90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 
(1970)), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 
1995) (emphasis in original). However, " 
'[i]f the consequence flowing from the plea 
is "collateral," then the defendant need not 
be informed of it before entering the plea.' 
" Id (quoting Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 
941, 944 (7th Cir.1989), cert denied, 493 
U.S. 1059, 110 S.Ct. 873, 107 L.Ed.2d 
956 (1990)). "A collateral consequence is 
one that is not related to the length or 
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nature of the sentence imposed on the basis 
of the plea." Id. Courts that have 
considered the question have held that 
failure to advise a criminal defendant of 
the possibility of enhancement should he 
later be convicted of another crime is a 
collateral, and not a direct consequence of 
pleading guilty, and Defendant cites no 
authority to suggest otherwise. See, e.g., 
United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 
528 (9th Cir.1990) ("The possibility that 
the defendant will be convicted of another 
offense in the future and will receive an 
enhanced sentence based on an instant 
conviction is not a direct consequence of a 
guilty plea."); People v. Marez, 39 P.3d 
1190, 1193-94 (Colo.2002) ("It is also 
well-settled that the consequences of 
subsequent acts by a defendant, even if 
those consequences are enhanced by an 
earlier guilty plea, are collateral rather than 
direct consequences of the earlier plea and 
therefore are not consequences of which 
the defendant must have been advised 
upon entering the earlier plea."); Ex parte 
Dumitru, 850 S.W.2d 243, 244-45 
(Tex.App.1993) ("[I]t is well settled that a 
trial court is not required to admonish a 
defendant that the consequences of her 
plea include the possibility that the 
conviction which ensues from the plea 
might be used for enhancement purposes in 
a subsequent trial"). 
**22 Furthermore, the "specific notice" Defendant 
claims he was entitled to in 1995, i.e., that in the 
future the Legislature would amend the DUI law so 
that a third DUI conviction in ten years would be 
charged as a third degree felony, would have been 
impossible to give. At most, the justice court can 
be responsible only for advising Defendant of the 
possibility of enhancement based on the DUI statute 
in force at the time of a future conviction, and 
again, Defendant has provided no evidence showing 
that he was not so advised. 
**23 In any event, Defendant has not shown that 
he was constitutionally entitled to "specific notice" 
at the time of his prior DUI convictions that those 
offenses could be used to enhance his current DUI 
conviction to a third degree felony. Thus, 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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81 P.3d 775, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 2003 UT App 381 
(Cite as: 81 P.3d 775, 2003 UT App 381) 
Defendant's due process argument is unavailing. 
CONCLUSION 
**24 The trial court correctly determined that 
application of the enhancement provision of the 
2001 amendment to Defendant's current DUI 
conviction violates neither the ex post facto nor due 
process clauses of the United States Constitution. 
**25 Affirmed. 
**26 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 
81 P.3d 775, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 2003 UT 
App 381 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
ORME, Judge: 
*1 The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of a 
charge of driving under the influence (DUI), a third 
degree felony given enhancement for prior DUI 
convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2), 
(6)(a) (Supp.2001). The State argues that the trial 
court improperly dismissed the charge based on its 
conclusion that the 2001 amendment to the DUI 
statute, as applied to Defendant's pre-amendment 
DUIs, violates the constitutional prohibition against 
ex post facto laws. 
Because this case involves the same issue of 
statutory interpretation, similar procedural history, 
and the same legal counsel as in State v. Marshall, 
2003 UT App 381, we granted the parties' 
stipulated motion to consolidate the two cases for 
purposes of oral argument. See Utah R.App. P. 3(b). 
In Marshall, we held that the 2001 amendment to 
the DUI statute was not an ex post facto law. See 
2003 UT App 381 at f 18. In light of our holding 
in Marshall, the trial court's order dismissing 
Defendant's third degree felony DUI charge is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for such 
proceedings as may now be in order. 
WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 
2003 WL 22682283 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App 
382 
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